Pubfic reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average i hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources. 
Besides the combat intelligence value, it was anticipated that this information could then be used to make quick-fix vulnerability reduction design changes, possibly saving lives.
The secondary mission was to gather damage assessment data for input into the live-fire testing database established at BRL This information would then be used to assist system engineers in identifying and correcting vulnerability flaws in the vehicle design.
This report will be in two volumes. This volume will discuss the operations conducted by the battle damage assessment team (BDAT) to accomplish this mission. The second volume will report on the technical damage assessments themselves.
BACKGROUND
The Vulnerability/Lethality Division (VLD) of BRL has the continuing mission to participate in live-fire testing of Army weapon systems. Live-fire testing involves actual firings of new weapon systems against realistic threat equipment as well as firings against U.S. systems.
The purpose of such testing is to collect data on the lethality and the survivability of U.S.
systems under realistic conditions.
A part of VLD's mission in live-fire testing is assessment, documentation, and analysis of the damage inflicted on targets. In connection with this mission, VLD has developed systematic procedures for inspecting and testing targets after each shot to assure that all damage which occurs is detected. These procedures are implemented in the field by means of checklists. The checklists are designed to lead the assessor through a systematic check of all the systems functions. When a failure is detected, a procedure is available for identifying the specific damaged component(s). The checklists are prepared by engineers familiar with system design who make certain all vehicle systems and subsystems are addressed in the checklists.
The checklists for this operation were put together by the Systems Assessment Branch of VLD in a format compatible for input into the already-developed Information Collection and
Reporting System (ICARS). In this way, the information contained in the checklists could be easily entered into the vulnerability database already established in BRL to support the Live Fire and Joint Live Fire Test Programs.
Analytical procedures have been developed which then translate the observed damage information, located in this database, into a quantitative measure of the degradation of the damaged vehicle's ability to perform a combat role. Design engineers would then use this information to recommend vehicle vulnerability reduction methods.
Many design recommendations to improve vehicle and crew survivability in combat have been made due to lessons learned in live-fire testing. The extreme cost of this testing, however, limits the number of tests which can be accomplished. It was felt that damage assessments of vehicles hit in combat would provide a unique and reasonably inexpensive opportunity to gather additional damage assessment data.
The mechanics of battle damage assessment under combat conditions are basically the same as damage assessments conducted during controlled testing. The intended use for the data is also basically the same, except the battle damage data also has some immediate utility to the field commanders. Because of VLD's experience in live-fire testing, much of the technical background for the battle damage assessment mission was already in place.
There are two significant technical problems in battle damage assessment that do not occur in controlled testing. In battle damage assessments, the attacking munition is not immediately known, nor is the operational condition of the vehicle prior to the attack known. It This addition will be discussed later. The rank structure of the final 12 man team was 2 majors, 2 master sergeants, 2 sergeants first class, and 6 staff sergeants. One of the majors served as the officer-in-charge (OIC) and one of the master sergeants served as the non-commissioned-officer-in-charge (NCOIC). The list of team members and their parent units is provided in Table 1 .
CONUS PREPARATIONS
Requests for additional personnel were forwarded to both the U.S. Army Armor Center and School and the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Command, but neither organization had the resources to participate. The chief of the Systems Assessment Branch, VLD, BRL was the first-line supervisor of the BDAT. He later became the team's primary point of contact for all CONUS communications/coordination.
All BDAT personnel were required to be "read on" to various Special Access Programs (SAPs) due to the possibility of the team's exposure to security situations covered under these programs. This security measure was handled through the BRL Security Office.
Due to the "be prepared" nature of the mission, it was decided that personnel would be attached to BRL only after the actual order to deploy was received. BRL then cut TDY orders during the necessary damage assessment training. All orders were prepared in advance with everything completed on these orders except the date of execution.
4.2 Training. The training for the BDAT was broken down into three separate phases.
The first phase consisted of the required five-day POR conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) from 17 through 21 December 1990. This training was set up and run by APG for all deploying personnel from the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and units assigned to APG. Besides the regular records checks and audits done for all PORs, training in desert living and culture, NBC refresher training, and enemy characteristics and traits were also covered.
The second phase consisted of vehicle familiarization training. There were five U.S.
ground systems of interest for the collection of battle damage information. These systems were the Abrams Tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Sheridan Armored Airborne Assault
Reconnaissance Vehicle, the M60-Series Tank, and the USMC LAV-25. Each BDAT member had experience on one or two of the systems, but none were familiar with all of them. For the level of the damage assessments planned, at least an operator-level knowledge on each system would be required. Thus, it was necessary to train to this level on each of the systems. This training was conducted with the assistance of the Ordnance School using their instructors and equipment. Training on all five of the vehicles was completed by 3 January
1991.
The last phase of the BDAT training consisted of battle damage assessment training.
Fortunately, several members of the team had experience in live-fire testing; therefore, they had a good grasp of what was required when assessing damaged vehicles. These members served as the core instructors for the majority of this training phase. Four general areas of instruction were given.
First, methods of identifying types of munitions by their signatures were studied. Since the weapon causing the damage would not be known in most cases, it was felt this would be a critical piece of information for unit commanders, besides being necessary in the vulnerability evaluation process.
Armor design and configurations of the five vehicles were studied. This was required to better identify and evaluate armor package performance on the battlefield. Also included in this portion was the handling of radiation monitoring equipment, monitoring and protection procedures, and decontamination procedures.
Live-fire test reports and videos were reviewed. This gave the BDAT members a much better feeling for the amount and type of detail which is required in evaluating damaged vehicles.
Finally, a practical exercise was conducted on a vehicle damaged during a live-fire test.
This exercise was conducted at a range belonging to the Combat Systems Test Activity.
One additional item that needs to be mentioned is the discussions held with a member of a previous damage assessment team the Army had fielded. Therefore, a logistics package was put together that allowed the team to be as self-sufficient and mobile as possible.
Rucksacks, flight bags, web gear, and other items of personal equipment not normally issued to soldiers in a TDA unit were requisitioned and distributed. Each team member was allowed a rucksack, a duffle bag, and a flight bag for all personal equipment. In addition, three 4-ft by 3-ft by 3-ft footlockers were constructed by the BRL shops to carry damage assessment equipment. Some equipment which could not be procured quick enough was provided through the assistance of the Maryland Army National Guard.
Damage assessment equipment was kept as simple and as maintenance free as possible.
No computer equipment nor automated data collection equipment was taken. Photo equipment, radiation monitoring equipment, and small system test sets, with backups, were taken. The small system test sets were designed and built to assist in vehicle diagnostics.
Special tools for measuring striking obliquity were taken. These tools were designed and built by the BRL shops. A partial list of supply items which needed to be purchased is provided in Table 2 .
The bulk of the equipment was in the form of technical manuals and the damage assessment checklists. It was not known if the reproduction of documents would be possible once in the KTO, so enough checklists and manuals had to be taken based on an estimate of total needs. In addition, it was felt that some, if not all, of the damage assessment information would be of sufficient time-critical value to warrant a quick return to BRL for analysis.
Therefore, prestamped and addressed envelopes were also taken to expedite shipping. It was planned that as each assessment was completed, all documentation and film would be placed in an envelope and immediately forwarded through Army channels for delivery to BRL. The availability of weapons for team members was coordinated through AMC for issue prior to deployment because it was not known if and when weapons would be issued in the KTO. The weapons were picked up for issue on the day scheduled for deployment.
However, they appeared to be in such poor condition that it was decided to test fire them prior to departure. Only 4 of the 11 weapons drawn functioned properly and departure had to be delayed 24 hours until substitute weapons could be found. Through the assistance of the Ordnance School, arrangements were made to draw eleven M16A1s from a unit located at Fort Belvoir, VA. This was accomplished and the weapons were test fired on the day of departure.
No arrangements for pay, mail, or other means of communication could be made due to the lack of coordination within the KTO prior to departure. During this period of preparation, several updates were written and forwarded through the BRL chain of command. Copies of these official updates are given in the Appendix.
OCONUS PREPARATIONS
Most of the OCONUS preparations were conducted in and around the BDAT's base camp co-located with the AMC-SWA office in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. These preparations were conducted prior to the BDAT deployment forward to VII Corps on 20 February 1991.
5.1 Personnel. Upon arrival in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, the BDAT was assigned to AMC-SWA. All personnel actions and accountability were handled through that office. Four High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) were issued-two of the four-seat design, and two of the two-seat design. These were picked up on 25 January 1991, Prior to that date, transportation was provided in the form of rental vehicles on loan to AMC-SWA and subsequently loaned out to BDAT members as needed.
Billeting, while assigned in the Dhahran area, was located in the Khobar Towers. This facility served as a processing area for the majority of U.S. Army troops. Tents or vehicles were used once the team moved from Dhahran.
Mess facilities were located throughout Dhahran and Khobar Towers, most without unit affiliation requirements. Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) could be procured at many of these facilities or through AMC-SWA for bulk issue. Water was also procured through AMC-SWA.
Once the ground war started, the units which the BDAT was supporting generously supplied whatever food and water they had available.
Additional items of equipment essential to desert and combat survival were acquired through various sources of supply. Radios, mounts, and secure devices were all acquired through the AMC supply point. Tents, NBC monitoring equipment, additional uniforms, and personal items were acquired. LORAN navigational equipment was located and signed for through ARCENT headquarters. Ammunition, additional MREs, bottled water, and medical supplies were acquired and stockpiled for future use. (Logistics) and G-3 (Operations) sections. This was the first occasion in which the BDAT was made aware of the upcoming Desert Storm ground offensive plan. At these meetings, the mission of the BDAT was explained, as were the benefits which could be gained by the unit commanders in having a damage assessment capability within their control. The main selling point which BDAT members had to emphasize was that they could provide a service which, to the unit commanders, was another combat multiplier, and this service was inexpensive to the unit commander. The only support requirements the BDAT would have would be for battlefield location clearance, some food and water support, and a means of establishing communications to the rear in case critical information was deemed necessary for immediate dissemination. Once the coordination for combat operations had been made, it was felt that coordination with ARCENT should also be completed. Attempts to make this coordination through LABCOM/AMC channels were unsuccessful. Therefore, again using personal contacts, discussions occurred with representatives in the ARCENT G-3 (Force Modernization) section. Late in the evening of 27 February 1991, the team was told to be prepared to send a representative the next day to conduct a preliminary assessment and a radiation check on several damaged vehicles. Due to the lack of technical expertise in the area of depleted uranium armor and bullets within the operational units, the Assistant Division Commander (ADC) requested the BDAT to assist in crew evacuation and in evaluating the radiation dangers which he felt were present in the damaged vehicles. On 28 February 1991, a BDAT representative, accompanied by the ADC and the brigade commander of that unit, was airlifted to the site of an earlier armor engagement to conduct this initial assessment and to assist in the crew evacuation. Given the amount of radiation present at the impact points on the damaged vehicles, it was determined that the vehicles had been hit by friendly fire. This first assessment set the stage for the BDAT's add-on mission of assisting in the investigation of friendly fire incidents.
After returning from this initial assessment, coordination was made for the entire BDAT (minus the section which had returned to VII Corps) to return to the site. On 1 March 1991, escorted by a mech infantry platoon and a recovery team, the BDAT moved out to begin the assessment of 1st Infantry Division vehicles. Those vehicles which could be found were assessed and the team returned to its base camp in northern Kuwait on 4 March 1991. At that time, link-up was made with the other section just returned from its coordination mission.
That mission had been a complete success with points of contact, vehicle identifications, and grid locations established for both the 3rd and 1 st Armored Divisions.
It was decided that the team would divide itself in half with one half covering the 1st
Armored Division area and the other the 3rd Armored Division area. The plan was for each section to completely cover all of the vehicles in its assigned area and then to fall back into the AMC-SWA base at KKMC. It was learned that KKMC would be the collection point for all battle damaged equipment, and it was felt that those vehicles not found on the battlefield would eventually show up there and could be subsequently evaluated. Each section took two vehicles and its share of the damage assessment and survival equipment. A photo of a typical damage assessment operation is shown in Figure 1 . In addition, a typical team base camp setup is shown in Figure 2 . Each section moved out to its assigned area on the evening of 4 March 1991.
A typical damage assessment operation consisted of an initial coordination meeting with DISCOM representatives, and then a move to a lower echelon unit for pinpointing vehicle locations and points of contact. Actually finding the vehicles to conduct an assessment could sometimes take days. In some cases, the BDAT would have to coordinate for combat unit escort and support. Unreported vehicles were also found, and the information on these would be passed on to the appropriate unit for recovery action. All moves had to be coordinated with the unit maintaining control for that area. This was to avoid mines, enemy pockets of resistance, and any other obstacles inherent in a battlefield environment.
It was during this time that attempts were made to assess the damage to Iraqi equipment.
Three factors led to the abandonment of this optional part of the mission. First, the danger involved with climbing over destroyed enemy equipment which had not been cleared of ammunition was too great a risk. In fact, on two separate occasions, enemy equipment Second, prior to the ground offensive, ARCENT had ordered that all Iraqi equipment be demilitarized whenever it was encountered. No one at that time knew how long coalition forces would be able to remain in Iraq and Kuwait. The opportunity for Iraq to reclaim repairable equipment had to be eliminated. Thus, the majority of Iraqi equipment was engaged multiple times, both during and after the cease fire. Determining primary defeat mechanisms, the most critical piece of information for damage assessment purposes, was virtually impossible given these conditions.
Third, it was felt that none of the equipment in the Iraqi arsenal was of sufficient intelligence value to justify an assessment of its vulnerability at the risk of the safety of team members.
Another mission relating to Iraqi capabilities was given to the BDAT by the BRL Foreign
Intelligence Office (FIO). There were specific pieces of Iraqi equipment which FIO considered of critical intelligence value. They felt it would be worth the effort to have the BDAT try to capture this equipment for exploitation purposes. The difficulty in acquiring this equipment was in snatching it from the Iraqi forces prior to their being able to destroy it-if it had not already been destroyed by Coalition forces. The BDAT was successful in this mission and the equipment was carried back to BRL for subsequent exploitation. The other half of the team, minus the OIC who had to complete the outbriefing requirement, was allowed to out-process a couple of days later. They arrived back in CONUS on 3 April 1991.
One other ongoing mission which had not been closed out was the decontamination of damaged vehicles by AMCCOM, described earlier in this report. To insure all contaminated vehicles had been checked, the BDAT OIC was required to return to KKMC to link-up with the AMCCOM team. Both teams compared their findings. In all cases, initial BDAT findings coincided with the AMCCOM team's findings. The OIC was then allowed to return to Dhahran to begin out-processing. He arrived back in CONUS on 10 April 1991.
RESULTS/CONCLUSIONS
The findings of the BDAT were subsequently used to support two major initiatives. The first was to aid in the Army investigation into friendly fire incidents. The BDAT information, standing by itself, could not answer all of the questions concerning what actually happened to each damaged vehicle. The information was, however, an important part of the whole story.
Once combined with the intelligence information, the operational situation, and the casualty reports, a better picture of each damage incident was developed.
From its return in April until September 1991, the damage assessment information was used exclusively as part of this ongoing investigation. As such, the highest levels of Army and Department of Defense leadership were briefed by BRL on the BDAT results. Working in conjunction with the ODCSOPS during this time, BRL was a primary participant in all of the investigation proceedings.
As a result of this work, a final determination of friendly fire casualties was publicly released by the Army in late August 1991. Secondly, task forces were established in both AMC and the Training and Doctrine Commands (TRADOC) to recommend both operational and equipment fixes to lessen the possibility of friendly fire engagements in future conflicts.
The second major initiative which the BDAT information supported was that for which it was originally intended-to suggest ways to reduce the vulnerability of Army ground vehicles against threat munitions. Information from each damage assessment was used to detect unexpected or surprising occurrences of damage to each of the impacted vehicles. This information supplements that which was collected during live-fire testing. This will be covered in more depth in Volume II of this report.
Several lessons were learned concerning the conduct of damage assessment operations in a combat environment. First, any form of data collecting which needs to be done cannot be accomplished unless it also provides a service to the supporting unit. The BDAT learned that any references made towards the value of the information for future designs or databases were ignored. The unit commanders, rightly so, were only interested in how the BDAT services could help them in their conduct of the war. Also, the support which the unit Commanders had to supply to support BDAT efforts had to be very inexpensive. His resources were tied to his own mission, and he, again rightly so, was hesitant to share those resources unless the payback to his mission justified it. The bottom line is that data collection operations have to provide a service to the operational unit and they have to be as selfsufficient as possible.
The rank structure of the team was satisfactory. A field grade officer OIC was a good requirement due to the required coordination with varied headquarters and staff elements.
The bulk of the team consisting of experienced non-commissioned officers allowed for the independence of operations which was necessary throughout the war.
Team size for individual assessments was adequate. Normally, assessments were c. All personnel will be attached to BRL once the order to move is received. BRL will then cut the TDY orders for all personnel.
These orders have, in fact, been completed as they are required for the POR. Personnel will remain with their parent units until such time as the movement order is received. It is anticipated they will then have 48 hours to report for deployment. It is felt that in this way, there will be minimum turbulence at the parent units given the nature of the orders. AMC Deployment packages have also been received for all personnel.
d.
Initial coordination has been made through LABCOM to AMC to organize incountry logistical support.
This coordination is currently ongoing. The POC for this coordination at AMC is LTC Dennis Schmidt of the AMC Desert Shield Office.
e. The funding of this effort is being addressed by Mr. D. Ore. However, it does not look like any plans have yet been made by any agency to cover TDY or training expenses. f. A training plan is being developed to train team members on the mission essentials.
Initial draft of this plan is expected Monday, 17 December. Additional training will also be handled during the POR process.
g. Mission checklists, supply requirements, and various personnel actions are ongoing. Interviews with personnel having previous experience from earlier conflicts have also been conducted. An initial in-brief for all team members is scheduled for Friday, 14 December at 1400. At that time, all members will receive copies of their orders, the deployment packets, and a review of mission requirements and expectations.
SLCBR-VL-S SUBJECT:
Desert Shield Support 2. Currently, the most critical area of concern is the logistical support (e.g. billets, mess, chain of command, transportation, etc.) which will be necessary once the team is deployed.
Initial communication with the tasking organization (HQ-DAMO-FD) has provided no assistance nor guidance. The specifics of transportation to Desert Shield is also a concern.
It is anticipated that these issues will be addressed by the AMC Desert Shield Office.
3.
Point 
2.
Reference a. assigned a mission to BRL in support of Operation Desert Shield.
Reference b. was the first update of actions taken to support this mission's accomplishments. This memorandum is another update on mission preparations.
3. The following actions have been taken since the 13 December update: a.
Processing for overseas reassignment for all personnel was completed on 20 December.
Four personnel from BRL, four personnel from the Ordnance School, three personnel from CSTA, and one from HEL completed processing for subsequent assignment to this team.
b. Training has been conducted in two phases.
Phase 1 involved the familiarization training of all personnel on the Abrams tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Sheridan Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and the USMC LAV-25.
Phase 2 was the damage assessment training which consisted of armor and armor penetrator classes, live fire testing familiarization classes, review of previous live fire damage assessment reports and videos, photography classes, and actual damage assessment tasks.
Due to weather and resource availability, not all of the damage assessment training is yet completed, but is scheduled to be finished NLT 14 January.
c.
Damage assessment checklists have been developed and are being formatted for subsequent input into the Information Collection and Reporting System (ICARS).
By using this system, checklists which have been completed by team members can be mailed back to BRL, along with the rolls of undeveloped film, and can then be immediately entered into the vulnerability data base already established here to support the Joint Live Fire and Live Fire test programs.
d. Orders attaching team members to BRL have been cut but are currently undated.
If needed, a notification system is in place to allow these orders to be forwarded and dated within a matter of minutes to insure quick final processing.
All personnel are also receiving evaluation reports which will be SLCBR-VL-S SUBJECT: Desert Shield Support Update undated. These reports are required due to the possibility of extended TDY. Additional personnel actions have been prepared (separate rations, additional pay, etc.) and will be executed when and if required.
e.
Requisitions for supplies have been prepared and forwarded. Some supply items have already been fabricated by BRL shops, and all camera equipment has been purchased. "Hard card" requests for supply items need to be expedited, and local purchase actions still need to done.
Team members have not yet had the opportunity to address these issues.
f.
Ft. Knox responded to the original tasking and asked how they could support.
A deficiency in Bradley-qualified personnel was discussed and a request to fill this void (one officer and one NCO Master Gunner) was forwarded to Ft. Knox for evaluation.
Discussions were then held with representatives of the Directorate of Personnel at Ft. Knox and it was learned that Bradley personnel were critically short, but that if TRADOC was brought on line to task Knox, somehow the slots would have to be filled.
It was decided that the need was not critical enough, given Ft. Knox's other missions, to continue with further efforts to get Bradley personnel.
4.
As in the last update, the most critical area of concern is the logistical support (e.g. billets, mess, chain of command, transportation, etc.) which will be necessary once the team is deployed.
Initial communication with the tasking organization (HQ-DAMO-FD) has provided no assistance nor guidance, except that a 48-hour mission response time will be authorized once notification is received.
Requests for assistance passed through LABCOM and AMC as of yet have shown no results down to this level. No theater clearance has been received nor is it known if it has been requested. It was learned today, however, that a representative of DAMO-FD was working on this issue. The LABCOM Desert Shield office (Mr. S. Montgomery) is attempting to find out the status of the clearance issue by working through the AMC Readiness Office (MG Arwood).
5.
Point of contact for this action is Major Dick Koffinke, 3-6293. c. Memorandum, USABRL, SLCBR-VL-S, 10 January 1991, subject: Desert Shield Support Update.
2.
Reference a. assigned a mission to BRL in support of Operation Desert Shield. Reference b. and c. were updates of actions taken to support this mission's accomplishments. This memorandum is the final report on mission preparations.
3.
The following actions have been taken since the 10 January update:
a. All training and security program read-ons have been accomplished.
b. The team was notified for deployment at 2145, 16 January. At that time, logistical support issues^previously addressed had not been resolved. The team was ordered to proceed to Dover for deployment ASAP.
c. The team was assembled with all equipment 0600, 17 January. Supply and administrative issues were resolved only with the outstanding support of many BRL personnel.
Except for the issue of personal weapons, the team was prepared for departure at 1530, 17 January, approximately 18 hours after notification. At 1600, it was learned that the team would initially report to the AMC (FWD) Detachment Commander once in-country, and would then be passed on to ARCENT control for further deployment.
d. Two days prior to deployment notification, it was decided that even without guidance for logistical support, it would be in the team's best interest to make arrangements for personal weapons. The initial coordination was done, however, once the notification was given and an attempt was made to draw the weapons, improper administrative actions held up the actual weapon draw. AMC Emergency Operations Center (COL Griggs) had to be notified to contact TECOM to pass down the authorization to allow the weapons issue. This was accomplished and 11 weapons were signed over to the BRL property book officer. Due to the condition of the weapons, it was decided to test fire them. Only 4 of the 11 weapons functioned properly.
SLCBR-7L-S SUBJECT:
Desert Shield Support Final Update e. Due to the personal initiative taken by members of the Ordnance School, arrangements were made to draw weapons from the 610th Ordnance Battalion at Ft. Belvoir.
This was accomplished at 1400 on 18 January. The weapons were test fired at Range 10 and found to be fully functional.
f. The team departed for Dover at approximately 1800, 18 January for subsequent deployment.
5.
